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BEVERLY PLC 
CASE STUDY 
This case has been prepared by Andrew Norton and Bill O’Rourke with the 
assistance and under the direction of Robert Brown at Cranfield School of 
Management. The case is intended for classroom discussion only and is not meant 
to demonstrate either good or bad management practice. The authors are grateful 
not only to the owners of Beverly Plc for their co-operation in case preparation but 
also to the European Foundation for Entrepreneurial Research (EFER) for their 
financial assistance in covering travelling expenses during case analysis. 
BEVERLY PLC 1 
ACONTINENTALADVENTURE 
Dennis Brown could now pause for breath. The success of his French company, 
Beverly (a subsidiary of Doulton G lass, itself part of the Pearson Group), had 
confirmed the promise excited by the first speculative marketing initiative back 
in 1980. In the intervening three year period Dermis had gained a close 
collaborator in the form of a talented ex Rugby player, Mark White. Together, 
they had began to exploit the market potential on the Continent for a special 
type of damp-proof protector developed by another part of the. Doulton Group. 
Their association with Doulton had been very useful but an even greater 
opportunity had been presented to them in the form of a Management Buyout. 
The possibilities for Brown and White now eclipsed the achievements of the last 
three years...... 9 
. 
Dennis Brown had made a career out of the direct-selling industry which had 
revolutionised selling methods in the United Kingdom during the 1960’s and 
70’s. Aggressive sales tactics had been eschewed by the major companies until 
then; they were perceived as being “unBritish” and “not the done thing”.* The 
revolution started in the double-glazing industry where Dennis Brown had been 
a Director of Coldshield Windows,* bought out by Pearson in 1968. 
l Industry Note on Direct Selling and Double G lazing (1) 
l Industry Note on Coldshield Window Experience (2) 
Dennis began to question why the direct selling method that had proved 
successful in both the US and the UK could not be replicated on the Continent. 
He had been transferred to Doulton’s French subsidiary (Beverly) early in 1980 
to develop the market there for Doulton’s damp-proofing products. 
Doulton had originally established a presence in France in 1974 to distribute a 
range of its glass products. This market had not proved attractive and Beverley 
was losing money. Dennis had a strong feeling that another Doulton product 
could be successfully marketed in France. 
U.K. Experience 
The Royal Doulton Group, as a by-product of its ceramic expertise, had patented 
a ceramic tube in the late 1960’s which had the propensity to attract and absorb 
moisture. This product had not been developed with the home damp-proofing 
market in mind. In fact a problem over the years was the fact that Doulton, and 
later Beverly, could not scientifically explain why the ceramic tube was able to 
absorb damp when inserted into a wail. 
Whilst the injection of chemical sealants into walls created a verifiable water 
barrier, thus being accorded an AgrCment Certificate Valid in all Europe, the 
action of boring and insertion of ceramic tubes in walls, aithough practised for 
more than a century in Europe, could not be scientifically demonstrated to 
totally prevent rising damp. 
Nonetheless, the tube process was effective in a vast majority of installations, 
explainable perhaps by the fact that even a slight reduction (2 to 3%) in rising 
damp enabled the internal surface of a wall to dry and permitted the plaster to 
retain newly applied paste and wallpaper. Wallguard (UK) led by Dennis Brown 
was thus able to grow rapidly in the 70’s, using direct selling promotional 
techniques to popularise the tubes. The company offered an original 5 year 
guarantee on its treatment (subsequently extended) safe in the knowledge, that 
any deterioration in tube performance (unlikely) could be remedied by chemical 
injection. Surveyors were additionally trained to diagnose severe cases of damp 
(using electronic meters) where only chemical treatment (bought in from 
Sovereign) would be successful. 
Possession of the unique Doulton tubes, nonetheless, gave the company the 
promotional opportunity to offer a unique damp treatment, enabling 
householders to avoid the highly expensive and inconvenient alternative of new 
floor foundations. Not surprisingly, therefore, from a standing start in 1974 the 
company had developed a 6 depot national coverage company by the late 1970’s 
and a turnover of over X2 million, earning 10% on sales. 
The UK damp-proofing market was near saturation at the beginning of the 80’s 
(see Sales Graph - Exhibit 1). Doulton’s ceramic tube had a static market share 
and was facing long term pressure from alternative damp-proofing companies 
using chemical injections. The uniqueness of the Doulton product enabled 
Wallguard to charge f 10 per foot run of 9” thick wah, but this was being 
undermined by prices of f5 per foot for chemical injection by Rentokil1 and for 
f3 by Peter Cox and others. 
Dennis was therefore able to suggest to his bosses at Doulton the merits of a trial 
marketing exercise for the ceramic tube in France. The timing was not right 
however for an major new initiative. In common with most other large UK 
companies, Doulton was having to grapple with the problems of difficult trading 
conditions and incipient world-wide recession. Interest rates were purposely 
raised by the new Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher to quell 
inflation leading to a strong appreciation in the value of the pound. Overseas 
expansion was not high on the agenda of many companies. 
FRENCH MARKET TEST 
The question then came of how to test the market on a low cost basis. Dennis’s 
solution to the trial marketing exercise was ingenious. He recognised that * 
Doulton was not inclined to support either a fully researched product launch or 
upfront investment in personnel. Finding no mention in Thompson’s Yellow 
Pages equivalent in France for Rising Damp Treatment (“SalpCtre”), a triai 
newspaper advertisement was prepared (Exhibit 2) for testing in the Parisian 
region., the area most comparable with U.K. The advert was placed in the Paris 
Edition of the T.V. magazine, Tele 7 jours, in late November 1980. 
The magazine was reassured to accept the advertisement by the fact that the 
Doulton Glass had a registered office in Versailles. The Royal Doulton name 
was used in the advert to emphasise the English nature of the company and the 
idea that the English ought to know something about rising damp! The response 
to the advert was very high - over 200 interested households. This figure was 
well above the response rates from UK adverts and a clear signal of latent 
interest in the product. A card was prepared telling the respondents that due to 
the unprecedented demand there would be a 3 month delay before installation. 
This breathing space allowed Brown time to import the required tubes and find 
the initial installers able to do the necessary work. 
The initial market reaction was encouraging but Dennis lacked a team based in 
France who could progress the concept. Part of the solution to this obstacle 
came from a chance encounter from among Dennis’s large network of contacts. 
Mark White had graduated from Liverpool University in French and Rugby; his 
prowess on the rugby field had led to an invitation from Maurice Colclough, the 
England lock-forward to join him playing for a French club side. Mark had a 
variety of jobs in France but was amenable to the offer of a position with 
Beverly. Dennis now had the benefit of an able assistant who, moreover, was 
familiar with the language and customs of France. 
LAUNCH, 198 1-2 . 
Dermis and Mark were able to consolidate the company’s position in the French 
market during the period 1981-1983 through a combination of initiative and 
favourable external conditions. France was in recession after a failed attempt to 
reflate its domestic economy. The situation was particularly acute in Northern 
France, where there was a ready supply of eager, aspiring salesmen who would 
accept dif&ult working conditions. It is almost perfunctory to note the huge 
distances involved in the daily schedule of a direct salesman in France, so that 
sales territories were strongly denoted as being “France!” 
The “initiative” factor was the readiness of the principals to test the unwritten 
assumption that French laws and customs made direct selling impossible. As the 
concept of ‘self-employed’ direct selling sales agents was little known in France, a 
legal contract was drawn up under French Law ensuring that agents would be 
paid only on commission (15% of net contract) with no employment charges 
falling on the company (copy contract A attached). Only surveyors were taken 
on as contracted company employees (copy appointment letter, B, attached), 
with installation teams again being self-employed, supervised by surveyors. 
The marketing approach taken in France closely followed the successful English 
pattern Advertising was centered in Tele Sept Jours, always the best source, and 
local papers which gave rise to a number of leads pursued by the direct salesmen. 
The salesman was expected to generate his own business. The business was also 
driven by word of mouth and it was therefore imperative that Mark, as General 
Manager, ensured that quality of work done remained high. One bad job could 
result in serious loss of business in any one particular area. 
Using the Doulton Glass office in Versailles as a base, Mark during 1981 was 
able to build a reliable team comprising a surveyor, installation supervisors and 
back-up book-keeper to serve the Paris market. The best salesman was made 
sales-manager. Tubes and chemicals were imported from England and stored in 
the office basement; capital expenditure was minimal. Installation crews need 
only small electrical drills, vans were leased. Advertising was the major expense, 
so by the end of the year, with 7 full time employees, and cumulative sales just 
under f 100,000, the company broke-even on the year. 
. 
Dennis was determined not to repeat some of the mistakes that had lead to 
difficulties and fast growth of competition in England: frequent price increases 
would be avoided by setting an initially ‘satisfactory’ price, to give a 65% gross 
margin AFl’ER direct materials, sub-contract labour and selling commissions, 
which would allow 20% of turnover to be spent on direct advertising. Far 
greater use of chemical’ treatment would be recommended, with a 20 year 
guarantee, to avoid costly re-work after faulty tube installations (although 
advertisements would stress the unique, to Beverly, tube approach). 1% of sales 
turnover would be retained for remediais. 
An optimistic sales budget of f850,OOO was set for 1982, with flOO,OOO 
advertising expenditure; a second storage depot and installation team was 
established in Arms to cover North of Paris to the Coast. Results proved their 
optimism justified; a profit of f75,OOO was earned on turnover close to budget 
(Exhibit 3). Sales leads (Exhibit 4) through the year were closely monitored, as 
were converstion ratios and costs per lead (below f5 per lead). The Christmas 
Party for the sales agents at the Old Airfield, Versailles, was a very happy affair! 
BUYOUT OPPORTUNITY 
Beverly was never more than an interesting experiment within the wider Doulton 
group. In 1983 several events happened which changed life significantly for the 
principalx- 
- Direct selling in the U.K. had come under media scrutiny and 
criticisms levelled at the more energetic proponents of the style; 
double glazing salesmen in particular had become something of a 
music-hall joke! 
- Large companies were slowly returning to profitability often through 
a policy of cost-control and divestment of non-core business. 
By early 1983, Doulton, following failure to stem losses despite drastic surgery, 
had divested itself of its direct-sales subsidiaries including Coldshield, Wallguard 
(in the UK) and Muliberty Home Extensions (see CSW note). Dermis realised 
that he had a outstanding opportunity when Doulton Glass was itself taken over 
by a South African backed company, Solaglas. The new owners of Doulton 
Glass had no requirement for a small subsidiary in France especially as they 
were denied visas to visit the company. Its rising damp treatment was seen as 
incompatible with the new groups international glass concentration. Beverly, 
Dermis sensed, could be a candidate for a buyout, many of which were taking 
place in 1983 based on the incompatibility of the subsidiary within the context of 
the larger group. 
The Negotiation 
The new owners not only saw Beverly as incompatible, but were also anxious to * 
avoid involvement with further direct selling activities. While the early trading 
results for Beverly in 1983 were close to budget, the. declining sales leads 
statistics (Exhibit 5) raised doubts as to whether Beverly had already peaked in 
N.France. They were aware that a former glass manager had left in 1982 to set 
up a rival company in Paris (see Dema advertisement - Exhibit 6). It was an easy 
business to enter. The Beverly company had few assets, but by mid year had 
close to f 170,000 in cash in bank (see Balance Sheet summary - Exhibit 7). 
Dennis saw the company quite differently; they would have to stop using the 
Doulton name but, nonetheless, this was a real opportunity to make a lot of 
money if only he and Mark could handle the negotiations correctly. He 
wondered how to go about making an offer for the company. 
INDUSTRY NOTE 1 
NOTE ON DIRECT SELLING AND DOUBLE GLAZING 
‘Direct Selling’, thought to have been introduced into England in the 1950’s from 
America, initially as a means of selling Encyclopaedia Britannica, comprises two 
main elements: 
(1) the salesman is registered as “self-employed”, responsible for his or her 
own tax and working arrangements; 
(2) the company “employing” self-employed salesmen, advertises the ’ 
product/service direct to the public, providing “leads” (usually tear-off 
coupons from the advert) on a controlled basis to the salesmen. 
This sales method had the advantage compared with conventional selling of 
being relatively low cost and low risk, particularly for smaller companies in 
developing new markets (avoiding fixed costs of salaried salesmen, plus 
associated fringe benefits) as well as being entirely results oriented and 
motivating for the salesmen (no sales commission paid unless a ‘lead’ was 
actually converted into an actual order). By the salesman taking a lO-20% cash 
deposit at time of order, with balance on job completion, direct selling also 
provided a comfortable “cash cushion” for the operating company. 
The practice became widespread and instrumental in helping the development of 
the domestic double glazing market in the UK in the 1970’s, where a large 
amount of personal selling was required in “unsocial” hours i.e. evenings or week- 
ends, when both domestic partners in decision making could be present. With 
most U.K. houses having non-standard window sizes, ‘direct’ salesmen were 
equipped to measure, price for an increasingly complicated product range 
(secondary windows, double glazed units, replacement frames) and provided a 
written quotation on the night (ranging from f500 for secondary windows to over 
f5,OOO for full double glazing by the end of the decade), with lease-financing 
packages. 
Disadvantages of the direct selling method, once companies and markets 
matured, included lack of loyalty or career progression by self-employed with any 
particular company, inevitable mobility by better salesmen to new ‘faddish’ 
products (e.g. double glazing succeeded by fitted kitchens), as well as the 
increasingly high ‘fixed’ cost of advertising in maintaining lead generation and * 
salesmen retention. What began, therefore, as a low cost, low risk sales 
expansion strategy in young markets, is rapidly transformed into a high fixed cost 
(advertising), high risk selling strategy in maturing markets (see Coldshield 
Window Note). 
INDUSTRY NOTE 2 
THE COLDSHIELD WINDOW EXPERIENCE 
Coldshield Windows (CSW) had begun in the late 1960’s as an entrepreneurial 
diversification by the owner’s son of the small Mulberry G lass company in 
Manchester. By developing an effective manufacture, installation, advertising 
and direct selling team, propelled by the growth of domestic central heating and 
concern with rising energy prices as a result of oil price explosion in the 70’s, 
CSW was an early leader in the fast growing replacement window or double 
glazing market in the 1970’s. Sales turnover frequently doubling each year, as a - 
network of 14 assembly and installation depots was established to cover the 
county, and some 500 direct selling employees were engaged, sales reached f 15 
million by the mid 1970’s and peaked at f26 million in 1979. With earnings at 
10% of sales, CSW had become the most profitable division in Doulton G lass. 
The rapidity of CSW’s rise was only matched by the speed of its decline, 
coinciding as it did with: 
1. The U.K. economic downturn in the first two years of Mrs. Thatcher’s 
government; real GNP declined 2% per a~un~, and the double glazing 
market registered its first ever 1% fall. Most double glazing companies, 
including CSW (see Graph 1) had budgeted for a 25% sales increase (the 
previous five years industry average) and while improving somewhat, were 
still unable to keep optimism out of subsequent years forecasts. 
2. 1978 had been the final year of a management “earn-out” for the original 
Mulberry entrepreneurs. Under the terms of the Pearson acquisition, a 
put and call option had been agreed, enabling original owners to seil their 
minority shareholding at an agreed price/earnings multiple 5 years later. 
This had encouraged minority shareholders, who were responsible for the 
day to day running of the company, to maximise 1978 earnings. In 
particular, by bold pricing in a growing market, CSW retail prices were 
shown by AGB Market Research in 1979 to be between 10 and 30% 
higher than main competitors. CSW’s market share was nonetheless only 
estimated at 5% of the total market, the market leader being Everest with 
15% market share: major brands accounted for only one-third of the 
market. 
3. CSW’s success has been based primarily on local and subsequently . 
national newspaper advertising, feeding leads to its direct selling force. In 
the face of a static market and increased competition (see Major 
competitors promotional methods), the company was initially reluctant 
and subsequently unable to rapidly diversify its selling methods. As the 
cost per advertising lead rose from under f 10 in the late 1970’s to over 
f40 in 1980, the company was increasingly unable to feed and maintain its 
direct selling force. 
Despite halving its assembly and installing work force and depot network 1980- 
82, the company was unable to stop its losses, leading to its sale by Pearsons in 
mid 1982, for some 75% of its net asset value, to its original owners. Despite 
valiant efforts, losses actually increased for the next 2 years, leading to eventual 
absorption and closure of the company by the Hawley Group. Among the 
double glazing major competitive brands in the 1980’s, Anglian remains a 
successful BET subsidiary, Everest ownership has changed twice and Thermastor 
has recently gone into receivership. 
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PROMOTIONAL METHODS OF MAJOR DOUBLE-GLAZING 
COMPETITORS, 1982 
1. Everest 
Major sponsors of Horse Shows and Show Jumping, strong presences in 
all exhibitions connected with Home Improvements and at certain other 
regional exhibitions. 
Heavy spenders on television and in the last 12 months have spent large 
amounts on press advertising. 
They also recruit very strongiy for people prepared- to canvass and 
distribute leaflets on a large scale. 
3 L. AlDine 
Have permanent in-store displays at Debenhams. Have recently spent 
large amounts of money on television., national press and professional 
drop cardings. They also take part in all the major Home Improvements 
Exhibitions. 
3. Anelian 
Have at least 80 showrooms around the country and are still opening new 
shops. 
Some national press advertising but most of the effort is on a local basis, 
via regionai shops. The local manager is paid on a percentage of its 
turnover for advertising or leaflet dropping. 
4. Crittd 
Mainly national and local press, although they have recently used 
television. They have now opened a number of showrooms in the style as 
Anglian 
5. Thennastor 
Market by way of national press advertising, backed up by T.V. and a . 
canvass drop card operation. 
. 
6. Alcan 
Mainly national press and some television, plus local advertising via their 
local offices. 
Large T.V. campaigns, comparable to Cold Shield f2 million annual 
spent. 
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Pircct Sales Agents Contract (A) 
CONTRAT D’AGENT COMMERCIAL 
ENTRE : 
SOCII!TE VERRIERE DOULTON, Societe de droit francair, SARL au caoital da 
200.000 francs, dont le si&ge social en 75-77, Rue du . DocAew tJaillant 
78210 ST CYR L'ECOLE representee par Monsieur Xark WHlTE , son 
G&ant, cl-apris appelee NLe‘Ciandantla, 
D’UNE PART, 
ET : 
&mieur LIZE Basile 
78200 XANTES LA VILLE 
ci-aprQ appele u L’Agerw , 
domiciiie a Chemin des Broue+s 
. 
D’AUTRE PART. 
Articie 1 - Mandat d’Agent Commercial. 
Par le present contrat qui sera regi par le decret du 23 dkembre 1958 et let textes 
subsequents relatifs aux agents commerciaux, le Mandant confie e I’Agent qui accepte, 
le mandat de le rep&enter afin d’obtenir des commandes pour la pose et I’innallation 
de barrikes d’etancheite et des produits s’y rapportant selon let pro&d& utilids par 
le Mandant, aimi que pour la vente, la promotion et la distribution de to.ut produit 
offen a la vent8 par le Mandant. L’Agent exercera son mandat en pleine independance 
et liberte. II peut accepter la representation d’autres entreprises non concurrentes sans 
avoir B en referer ou a en obtenir I’autorisation, conformement aux termes de I’article 
7.4 ci-dessous. 
Article 2 - Ouree - RBsiliation. 
1. Le present contrat est conclu pour une duree determinbe d’un an. II prend effet 
a compter de ce jour et se terminera le 06 Octobre 1083 
2. II est expressement convenu que le present contrat ne pourra dtre renouveld taci- 
tement. Les parties devront se rhnir au moins quinze (15) joun awnt la fin du 
contrat pour d6cider s’il y a lieu de le renouveler pour une nouvelle phriode, ledit 
renouvellement devant faire I’objet d’un krit sign4 par les deux panies ou d’un 
&change de lettres en tenant lieu. 
-2- 
3. Lorsqu’il aura et6 renouveie le contrat deviendra un contrat 8 durCe indbterminee 
qui pourra ktre r&iii& a tout moment par l’une ou I’autre des parties moyennant 
un prbavis rkiproque de trois (3) mois, lequel devra itre notif% par lenre recom- 
rnandbe aver demande d’avis de rbception. 
4. En outre, le prthent coqtrat pourra 6tre resili6 de plein droit et par anticipation 
par I’une quelconque des parties en cas d’inexkution ou de violation par I’autre 
panie de ses obligations aux termes du present contrat et ce, a I’expiration dun deiai 
de quime (15) jours b compter d’une mise en demeure rest&e sans effer, effect&e 
par lettre recommandbe avec demande d’avis de reception par celle des parties victime 
de cette inexecution ou de cette violation. Des fautes r&pet&s pourraient donner 
lieu Bgalement a une resiliation immediate du contrat. 
5. En cas de resiliation du contrat pour quelque cause que ce soit : 
at I’Agent devra promptement rendre au Mandant tous les documents a caractere 
technique, commercial ou publicitaire qui lui auront &t$ confibs par le Mandant 
dans le cadre du prhent contrat, ou devra en disposer selon IK instructions qui 
lui auront it6 donnees par le Mandant ; 
b) I’Agent devra immhdiatement rendre au Mandant tous les produits et leurs 
accessoires qui lui auront 6tb confik par le Pandant ou davra en disposer selon 
fes directives qui lui auront bte don&s par le Mandant ; 
cf tous IK frais support& par I’Agent dans I’accomplissement de ses ooligatlons 
contractualles aux termes des afinias a) et b) ci-deesus sent a sa charge. 
Article 3 - Indemnite. 
II est expreaement convenu que le refus par le hnandant de renouveler le present contrat 
a son terme, au la resiliation anticipee du present contrat par le Mandant au cas prevu B 
I’anicle 2.4 ci-dessus ne donnera pas lieu au versement d’une indemnite par le Vandant a 
I’ Agent. 
Article 4 - Territoire. 
Le territoire de compdtence et d’acitvitk dans lequel devra se derouler le present mandat 
d’Agent, comprendapproximativement : LA E?,4NCf . Toutsfois ces limites de 
la region peuvent Stre chang6es B tous moments suivant I’tSolution du march& 
Article 5 - Produitk 
- 
‘-. 
. \I... 
~2 
\ 
L-es produits faisant /‘objet du prdsent contrat (ci-aork cfles prcduits))) consistent en des 
barriires d’C:anchCite irubes c@ramiques anti.remontCes) ainsi que rous produits et mare- 
riaux s’y rapportant te!on le procid6 uti!isB par la Pandant, et tous awes produits offens 
a la vente par le Pandant. 
Article 6 - Obligations du hndant. 
* 
k.1 .- 
Le Wandant s’engage : 
1) a fournir a I’Agent tous documents B caractire technique, commercial ou publici- 
taire que Ies deux parties jugeront raisonnablement necessaires pour que I’Agent 
puisse remnlir son mandat : 
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2) a informer I’Agent dans les meilieurs dblais de toutes modifications apportees a 
ses tarifs, a sa documentation et a ses produits ; 
3) h envoyer h I’Agent une iiste des contrats, des confirmations de commandes echan- 
g& avec ies clients demeurant sur le Territoire ; 
4) a assurer entidrement la publicire des produits a ses frais. 
Article 7 - Obligations de I’Agent. 
L’Agent s’engage : ’ 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5; 
a faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour obtenir des commandes de produits et 
pour promouvoir IK ventes de ces produits dans ie territoire ; 
a se conformer scrupuleusement aux tarifs et aux conditions generates de vente 
Btabiis par ie fv%ndant, qui se reserve la faculte de ies modifier en avisant I’Agent 
au moins sept (7) jours li i’avance ; 
a transmettre au Mandant toute information d’ordre commercial ainsi que toute 
information sur la situation du march6 et de la concurrence, tout changement inter- 
venu dans le march6 ou dans la situation financiere des clients actuels ou futurs : 
a ne pas rep&enter et a ne p3s assurer la promotion ou la vente de produits concur- 
rents ou similaires a ceux utilises par le Mandant ; cependant I’Agent pourra exercer 
une activite d’Agent pour d’autrss maisons qui ne son? pas ‘en concurrence avec le 
Mandant ; 
a transmettre sans deiai au Landant toutes les commandes*qu’ii aura recueiiiies 
ainsi que tous renseignements et documents permettant au Mandant d’btablir IK 
bons de livraison ainsi que lea factures correspondant A chaaue expedition. 
Article 8 - Commissions. 1 
1. Une commission de Treize pour csz sur ie montant hors taxes de la 
commande facturee au client sera verse6 par le Pandant a I’Agent selon les moda- 
I;tes d@finies ci-aprb. 
b 
2. La commission sera payable dans un d&i de quinze (151 jours d compter du r&le- 
ment definitif de la facture par le client au Mandant. 
3. L’Agent ne rccevra aucune commission pour les comrnandes recues par le Mandant 
apres la resiliation du present contrat. 
4. Tous les frais support&s par I’Agent d3ns I’accompiissement de ses fonctions sont a 
sa charge sauf accord prealable et par (Icrit du Mandant. 
Article 9 - Marques - Brevets - Know-How. 
‘- Aucune disposition du present contrat ne pourra Gttre interpretee comme conferant 
a I’Agent une licence de rnarque, de brevet ou de know-how franoais ou &ranger 
dont ie Mandant est ou pourrait devenir proprietaire et dont ies produits font ou 
pourraient faire i’objet. 
-4. 
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b. 
I. L 
A I’expiration du present contrat, pour quelque cause que ce soit, I’Agent s’cngage 
4 cesser immddiatement d’utiliser le nom du Mandant ainsi que IK marques appane- 
runt B celuici. 
2. L’Agent r’engage B signaler au Mandant toute contrefaqon sur ie territoire des mar- 
ques et/au des brevets appartenant au Mandant et ayant un rapport aver i’objet du 
present contrat et 9 hi apponer son assistance dans toute action engagh par le Man- 
dant ou contra le Mandant relativement B une contrefa$on de marque et/au de 
brevet sur ie territoire. 
Article 10 - lntardictioti de cession. 
L’Agent s’engage B ne pas ceder sous que!que forme que ce soit ies droits et obligations 
rhitant pour lui du prhent contrat sans le consentement prbalable &it du Mandant. 
Article 11 - Non-concurrence. 
Pendant un an apr& I’expiration du contrat, pour queique cause que ce soit, I’Agent 
s’interdit de continuer a visiter pour son propre compte ou pour ie compte d’un tiers 
la client&e qu’fl prospectkit dans le territoire ddfini a I’article 4 pour des produits simi- 
laires ou susceptibles de concurrencer ceux du Mandant. 
Articfe 12 - Conditions ghhales. 
1. Le present contrat constitue i’int6gralM des conventions entre IK parties et remplace 
toute convention antkrieure &rite ou verbale 8 ce sujet. - 
Le prtkent contrat ne pourra itre modif% que par un avenant dcrit et sigh par les 
deux ~rties. 
2. En cas de nullith panielle ou totale d’une ou de plusieurs dauses du prksent contrat, 
IK autres clauses ou parties de clauses du pnhent contrat demwreront nhanmoins en 
vigueur. 
3. Le fait pour une partie de taker un manquement quelconque de i’autre panie dans 
I’exkution de SK obligations au present contrat ne devra en aucun cas itre interprkth 
comme une renonciation tacite a SK prbrogatives. 
s . 
Article 13 - Loi applicable - Juridiction. 
Le prCsent contrat est r6gi par la ioi franqaise et ies tribunaux de Versailles seront seuls 
competents pour connaitre de toute contestation retative 61 I’interprktation ou a i’exku- 
tion du prCsent contrat. 
Fait en double exemptaire a St W ie 05 Octobre 1982 
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EXHIBIT 7 
LINE cl REF: 
1 Net Fixtd Assets (Line 801 
2 Stocks & WIP 
3 Dtbton 
4 (Creditors) 
BEVERLY 
BALANCE SHEET SUMMARY 
(FF ‘000s) 
1983 
SEPT DEC MARCH JUNE SEPT DEC I 
1 7d 1 76 1 ‘b 1 lb 1 lb 1 ‘(a / 
531 ZO 275 203 3so ,775 
Id& to50 
ru7- I500 ISJO I,‘1 a 
_ . 
EbZ) (Joto) (lU%) QSlo) ($0 I b 6 / 0) 
. 
5 Working Capital (Lines 2 to 4) I 3s I .a I ZSS I a0 I 32.0 I 235 I 
6 Net Asstu Employed (Lints 1 + 51 “I. 4bL 33i ts I T31 w- Q -00 &I I 
7 HP Creditors 
R inter Company Loans 
3 3htr Loans 
10 Sub Total (Lines 7 10 9) 
. 11 Bank Balanctl(OvCtdraft) 892 89,e 11 80 I*41 ib8=l 9043 
12 Oi;isionrl Total (Lines 6 + 00 4 111 
Per Supporting Schedule (Lint 291 929 1’89 lbb95 f-i&,: =I 810 
BEVERLY GROUP PLC 2 
DEVELOPING A NETWORK OF EUROPEAN DEPOTS 
The negotiation to acquire Beverly had been neither long nor protracted. 
Dennis explained: “Whenever Solaglas started talking about price/earnings 
ratios or future earnings, I just said Mark and I planned to quit, take the key 
surveyors and start on our own! They soon gave up!” 
Under the terms of the management buyout, the acquisition vehicle ’ 
(NewBeverly) acquired Beverly for a cash consideration of f 10,000, this sum 
been funded by way of a loan from Dennis Brown In addition, NewBeverly 
agreed to repay an inter-group loan of FF2,032,OUO (around f 170,000) due to 
Doulton. The initial share capital of NewBeverly was f 10. At the time of the 
buyout Beverly had free cash balances in excess of the total consideration. 
After the smoke had cleared from the management buyout of Beverly, full time 
executive Chairman Dennis Brown and Group Managing Director Mark White 
were left with two branch offices in France, one at St. Cyr L’Ecole near Paris and 
the other at Arras near Northern France. Through purchasing Beverly, they had 
acquired a company that was profitable from day one. 
A new marketing campaign was launched, using initially the brand name ‘Royal 
Ceramic’ - Exhibit 8. (The French had never been able to handle the Doulton 
name, but Royal and England had appealed to them.) The use of the English 
flag also helped ensure that leads soon recovered in the autumn. Little more was 
heard of Derna, their recent glass competitor. 
What was now needed was a clear growth strategy to what they both saw as a 
huge gap in the French market for companies supplying building preservation 
services to the general public and to local authorities for use in housing and 
public buildings. The question now was how best to capture and exploit this 
market? 
Sales and Marketing Strategy 
The long term strategy devised by the directors was to establish a network of 
branches to cover France. This was to be achieved through the concept of 
“rolling out” the company from the two original branch offices and full time staff 
of 14. In effect, the original branches would take on business in areas further ’ 
and further away from their base. Business growth would be monitored to 
identify high growth regions. Once a new region had too many sales to 
successfully manage from the original branch, another new branch would be set 
up in the new high sales region. 
The effect of this policy can be seen in the map of France (Exhibit 9) showing all 
of the branches now operational. Table 1 shows all of the branches and the 
dates they were established. By 1987 a network had been established that 
provided extensive coverage of France. 
Management of growth 
The business generated by the new branches called for new management 
strategies. Therefore each of the branches was set up with a sales manager, an 
installation manager and/or a surveyor, plus a secretary. Each of the sales 
managers was to report daily to Mark White. 
2 
Initially the salesmen would get a sale by following-up on a media-generated 
lead or by simply cold-selling on the doorstep. However, to ensure against later 
complaints, the surveyor would always follow the salesman in, calling on the 
customer to ensure that the operation could actually be carried out successfully. 
The teams who actually carried out the work were always sub-contracted, though 
the same teams were always retained if they performed the job well. 
The directors of the company held board meetings once per month. Mark White 
managed the French operation whilst Dennis Brown was investigating possible 
growth in new regions. Increased sales were recorded at most of these board 
meeting (see Table 2). Despite these successes, Dennis Brown foresaw the 
problems of future saturation of the French market. In early 1984 business had * 
been growing beyond Northern France and into Belgium. However Customs and 
administration were causing problems, and if they could crack one European 
country, why not another? 
FURTHER EXPANSION INTO EUROPE 
Initial expansion into Belgium was suggested by Dermis Brown. In 1984 a new 
branch was opened at Wauthier-Braine, near Brussels. This expansion was eased 
by the fact that one of the Northern Region’s best salesmen actually lived in 
Belgium, knowing the local customs, language and lie of the land. Later this 
policy of promotion from within, where possible, was to become a cornerstone of 
any expansion undertaken. 
Some work was undertaken in England in 1986, as a result of requests from 
Hawley Group and Pearsons to affect remedial work on guarantees given by the 
now closed Wallguard (U.K.) Company. Attempts to introduce new customers, 
however, by direct selling showed again excessively high costs (over f40 a sales 
lead) and myriad competition, with chemical treatment now being offered by 
many builders and house renovation agents. Fortunately, this was not yet the 
case on the Continent and remedial work was ended in England in ‘87. 
Sales in Belgium were to prove encouraging (Table 2). However the original 
idea of using Belgium to “piggy back” into Holland was not proving a success. 
The different cultures of the two countries prevented sales penetration into 
Holland. Brown therefore enacted the setting up of a further branch in 
Veenendaal near Utrecht in 1988. 
By March 1989 Beverly was operating in three continental countries. Turnover * 
was approaching f4m and profits before tax were f550k (see Table 3). The 
question on the lips of Beverly was - “Where now?” . _ 
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TABLE TXREq CONSOLIDATED PROFIT AND LOS8 ACCOUNTS 
BEVERLY GROUP PLC 3 
GOING PUBLIC 
Dennis Brown as a busy man, is the sort who knows somebody somewhere who 
can help. His contacts suggested that the wise companies were moving towards a 
full listing on the Stock Exchange. The benefits suggested were improved 
credibility with customers and the general public and an opportunity to get a 
valuation of their company. Entrepreneurs had increasingly used flotation as a * 
means to realise the value of their company, especially in the period up to the 
stock-market crash in 1987. Furthermore, a public-listing made it easier to 
attract new investors into the company. 
On advice from Brown Shipley Stockbroking Limited, NewBeverly applied for a 
placing on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), which was considered a much 
cheaper method of obtaining their goals, rather than a full Stock Exchange 
listing. In late March 1989,2,193,000 Ordinary shares were placed on the USM, 
via a Private Placing, at a price of 57p per share, bringing the total number of 
Ordinary shares in issue following the placing to 6,428,600. At this placing price, 
the market capitalisation of the NewBeverly group was f3.67m. The Placing 
Document stated that the expenses directly relating to the Placing would be 
f 120,000. Messrs. Brown and White would receive the bulk of the cash raised, 
leaving f130,OOO for NewBeverly itself. They retained majority control of the 
company. 
Company reasons for the placing were reported as follows in the placing report: 
‘The Directors believe that the company has reached a stage in its development 
which makes it appropriate to seek permission for its share capital to be dealt in 
on the USM... 
. ..The Directors anticipate that the enhanced status of the group will increase the 
rate of growth of its business particularly with local authorities and other major 
customers who have rigourous vetting procedures for new suppliers. It should 
also facilitate the expansion of the business by acquisition although no specific 
company has yet been identified... 
. ..The net proceeds of the issue of new Ordinary shares are to be used to finance ’ 
the expansion of the business, principally by the group acquiring or establishing 
its own chemical manufacturing base in the UK.” 
The prospective price earnings multiple at the placing price was 10.46, not 
spectacular but attractive enough for the investors in the USM who had 
witnessed successes during the 1980’s such as the Body Shop. The USM flotation 
proved successful. Beside the 33% each of the total shares held by Dennis 
Brown and Mark White, the rest of the shares were now held by over 250 small 
shareholders, none of whom held over 5% of the company. 
A major question arose for the Directors of NewBeverly. Both Brown and White 
were now both personally wealthy and still maintained overall control of 
NewBeverly. However where was the growth they had promised to their new 
shareholders to come from? Acquisition, market diversification into related or 
non-related products or services? Perhaps into water filtration or humidifiers, 
which had previously been mooted? There was even a snippet in the prospectus 
of moving towards selling golfing equipment. Perhaps it would have been better 
to have kept the company private after all! (see Richard Branson aticle, ‘Glad to 
be Virgin.) 
Running parallel to the problems of where to grow were the usual problems 
facing all entrepreneurs who must move towards organised business structures. 
Where was the management, administration and back up services to come from? 
A lot of energy and time would now quickly have to be invested to bring about 
expansion of the company - new projects and new people to run them. Another 
possibility therefore raised its head at the time. Perhaps now was the time to sell 
out and move on? Particularly, as now, even the climate had turned sour. 
WHERE TO NOW? JUNE 1990 
With fl milhon sitting in the Bank, NewBeverly’s company accountant was 
watching movements in deposit rates on his Teletext screen. It was raining 
outside but unfortunately this was a rare occurrence in the summers of 89 and 
90. In France the position was even worse with droughts being declared in many 
areas of the country: it was being suggested that the water-table itself had fallen. 
Holes in the ozone layer are not good news for the damp-proofing industry. The 
audited accounts for the financial year ending March 1990 reflect depressed 
trading conditions and prompted Dennis Brown to comment as follows:- 
“As indicated in my interim statement in December, the absence of 
growth in turnover, and its consequent effect on profits has been caused 
by the unusually prolonged period of warm dry weather which prevailed 
throughout Europe during 1989 and has continued to the present. This 
was particularly noticeable in Holland which started operations last year, 
and contributions from this area were minimal. Whilst the results overall 
are disappointing, margins have been maintained, and effective use of the 
group’s cash resources, in the absence of alternative investment 
opportunities, has resulted in a significant increase in interest earned.” 
What alternative strategies are open to the management at the present time? 
There are several avenues that are being actively pursued:- 
1) Vertical Integration through the acquisition of chemical manufacturing 
business. The annual report states that the company is in contact with certain 
companies in the UK but to date no firm decisions have been made. 
2) Continued Market Extension through expansion of the damp-proofing 
business into other Western European countries. Germany is a possible target. 
3) Diversification into related and non-related businesses. NewBeverly has 
already started to go down this route through 2 initiativex- 
[i] the company has begun to market water-filtration products. These employ the 
old Doulton ceramic technology and are currently being test marketed in the . 
South of France. 
[ii] Mark White has developed an interest in the importation of golf equipment 
into France. The company now owns a “Professionals” shop on a public golf 
course in France and it is envisaged that this business will grow. 
Another real cloud on the horizon was in the shape of a depressed share price. 
By January 1990 the share price had fallen almost 50% to 30p. The Financial 
Times did comment that the company might offer a larger competitor a ready- 
built way into the European market and for this reason the share was tipped. 
The current share price is 20p. Dennis, the entrepreneur now public company 
chairman, wondered which of the options open to the company he should 
pursue! 
Best of Business 
W INTERVIEW 
Since Richard Branson 
turned his back on the City 
of London, his Virgin pop, 
shop and airline empire 
has flourished. 
Photographs by John Stoddart 
Glad to be 
Virgin, 
T o the public at large, 
Richard Branson is nrobablv most 
famous for his dare-devil” esca- 
pades. His crossing of the Atlantic 
in a vast hot-air balloon came close 
to killing him, and his attempt to 
win the Blue Riband for the fast- 
est crossing of the Atlantic on 
water, which he made in a high- 
speed powerboat, was scarcely 
less dangerous. 
Away from the world of adven- 
ture, Branson’s other public activ- 
ities are equally unconventional. 
As a contribution to the battle 
against AIDS in the United King- 
dom, he set up a charitable trust 
and launched Mates. a range of 
cut-price condoms. But in the 
world of business, the British en- 
trepreneur is almost certainly 
best known for turning his back 
on the conventional financial re- 
sources of the City of London. 
Branson made his Virgin rec- 
ords, retailing and leisure group 
into a public company in 1986, and 
rapidly regretted having done so. 
He felt that the City didn’t under- 
stand his business well enough to 
value it properly, and he was irked 
by endless formalities that he 
feared would throttle Virgin’s 
growth. After two years of in- 
creasing frustration, Branson did 
what many observers thought was 
impossible-he took Virgin back 
into his private ownership. He 
bought out all the company’s 
shareholders and committed him- 
self to expanding Virgin without 
the sources of finance available to 
public companies. 
Branson has never regretted 
the decision, and his gain has been 
the City’s loss. When Virgin went 
private, it was valued at E248 mil- 
lion, or+45 million, and its share- 
holders-who had seen the price 
of their shares gyrate between 
1’75~ and 85p-were happy to take 
Bmnson puts people first and has 
replaced the jinatil resources open 
to public companies by fuming links 
with like-minded Japanese. 
140~ a share. the price at which the shares had been issued. 
Now, two vears later, Virgin has expanded worldwide: and 
the group,“including the Virgin Atlantic airline, which was 
not part ofthe public company, is estimated to be worth more 
than El billion. This growth has made Branson. who is just 40 
and whose tirst entrepreneurial venture was the launch of a 
student magazine in the Sixties, when he was a teenager, one 
of the richest men in Britain. He does enjoy some of the trap- 
pings of multimillionairedom: a private island in the Carib- 
bean-appropriately, one of the British Virgin Islands: a 
lovely home in West London, where he was interviewed for 
Best qiBusiness I&rnational: and another in rural Oxford- 
shire. But until recently, his favourite hide-away was his of- 
fice aboard a boat on one of London’s canals. 
It still takes a very special occasion to squeeze this gentle, 
bearded man into something that resembles a business suit. 
Yet no one can mistake his business acumen. and the team 
who work with him are keenly aware of Branson’s knack of 
taking a good business idea and turning it into something 
even better. 
There is no more striking example of this than the rise of 
one of his own brainchildren, Virgin Atlantic Airways. When 
the group went public, experts in the City warned that it 
would be better to leave the airline, which they regarded as a 
highiy speculative business, out of the package. Today it is 
competing successfully against much bigger rivals on routes 
across the Atlantic and to Tokyo. 
The airline is run in the same distinct style that colours the 
entire group. Branson believes in delegation. good rewards 
for his 4,000 employees and the motivation of staff. whether 
they are selling records in his lMegsst.ores or working as 
members of the airline’s cabin crew (who have his home tele- 
phone numbers just in case they need to talk to him). His 
approach to management can best be described as “bottom- 
up”. Branson believes that if the interaction between staff 
and customers is successful, and the staffare happy, then the 
business will prosper. 
But if his peopie-conscious management style is right for 
the Nineties, it also delivers performance good enough to 
satis@ the most hardnosed executive. In 1983 Virgin’s pre- 
tax pmrits were E2 million. In 1989, including the contribu- 
tion of the airline, they topped EO million. AMeanwhile, in 
place of City finance, Branson has been quietly substituting 
partnerships with large like-minded companies in Japan. 
1 Turning Virgin back into a private company only two 
years after going public was controveniai. But you were 
clearly very unhappy running Virgin as a public company. 
Why did you gu public in the fimt place? 
About four masons are given to you for going public. One is to 
increase the company’s public profile, which can be good for 
business. Second, you have paper you can use to make acqui- 
sitions. Third, it increases your borrowing capabilities. And, 
fourth, people can be incentivised because you can give them 
shams. It is also an opportunity to involve the public in your 
company. 
Increasing our ability to borrow money was important. 
Just a year before going public we had a 23 million bank- 
overdraft facility. That was for a group turning over fl50 mil- 
lion and earning about Xl2 million. We wanted to get out of 
the clutches of that facility in order to expand. 
We went public as a clear-cut entertainment group, with- 
out the airline, and we attracted a great number of small 
shareholders-55,000 of them. We had reasonable institu- 
tional support, but not absolutely fantastic, and we’d set the 
price that we asked at 14Op per share, which was below what 
the market would take. 
J Did disenchantment set in quickly? 
In the ensuing year protits doubled. The day before announc- 
ing the figures. which we expected to push up our shares to 
240p-or at least ZiOp-the crash of October 1987 took place, 
and they dropped to about 83~: and despite announcing dou- 
bled profits, the price didn’t move the following day. Looking 
back at the original list, I asked myself where were the 
advantages of being a public company? We were not incen- 
tivising our staff the share price had to claw back up to 140~ 
born 83~ before they could get anywhere. We were not incen- 
tivising our recording artists. and some of them had actually 
bought in at 140~. My nextdoor neighbour in Oxfordshire 
had come in at 140~ with most of his life savings and was 
showing a loss of f40.000-and although he never said any- 
thing, playing tennis with him wasn’t much fun. We had 
paper that was valueless to us because we felt the company 
was worth a great deal more. and we definitely didn’t want to 
use that paper to buy other companies! 
a But weren’t there some advantages? 
Our bormw-ing capabilities had been enhanced enormously, 
as had the public profile of the company. People had realised 
that Virgin was a considerable force to be reckoned with. 
And we had all learnt tirn the experience. But what we’d 
learnt most was that we didn’t usnt to be a public company. 
Being public is incredibly time-consuming. You have board 
meetings for nonexecutive directors: you have “board meet- 
ings” the day before real board meetings; and every single 
thing has to be vetted by lawyers. You are tied up in tape. 
Amund 50 percent of our time was spent worrying about 
going to stockbrokers’ meetings, analysts’ meetings, institu- 
tional meetings, making sure everything was done by. the 
book-and worrying about the next quarters results, the 
next six months’ results, rather than planning for the long 
term. And so we thought, Let’s ty to get out oj’this. 
I That wasn’t easy, though? 
InitiaIly we were told that it wasn’t the done thing, but we 
found a good merchant banker who felt it was doable. We 
decided we wanted to bow out gracefully and make sure ev- 
erybody got their money back. Your reputation is really all 
that you’ve got, and it’s worth paying out more than you can 
just get away with to keep it intact. And so we bid 14Op, 
which was over 50 percent more than the share price. We had 
a very good response. Everybody felt we’d been fair. 
4 Have you had any regrets since? 
In the last 18 months we’ve achieved two or three times what 
we achieved when we were a public company. There is a won- 
derful sense of tieedom, a feeling that a weight has been 
lifted off our shoulders. We’ve proved to the City that our 
company is worth a great deal more. Admittedly, certain 
things have gone very well-but we always told the City 
they would go well. We set up in the U.S. three years ago as 
Virgin Records America, and we told the City it was going to 
cost money for three years. but that we’d break into profits 
during the third year. In the first two years it was costing 
a lot and we came under criticism. but we’ve now got a ma- 
jor force in America- a record company which turns over 
$100 million and is making money. We have our own record 
company in 28 countries and. by organic gmwth. have become 
the world’s sixth-biggest record company. A few months ago 
we sold a stake in our record company to Pujisankei of Japan 
for $I00 million-and that put a value on it of E400 million. 
This does, I think, indicate that the City’s approach in 
vaiuing companies can be a bit askew. When we went pri- 
vate. the group was capitalised at E248 million without the 
airline and travel businesses. With them, it was probably 
“My parents brought me up with a lot ofpraise. I think ifyon are running a company, you sholcld ,,el-er really 
criticise your staff. You should always be praising:‘<f’ yotc praise somebody, they’re going to blossow .*’ 
worth around E500 million. There have been conservative 
estimates that today the group is worth about El.1 billion. 
g You have set up 8 number of partnerships since going 
private. Is this the way ahead? 
We’ve decided to bring partners into a number of our ven- 
tms on a small scale. In Japan we’ve joined up with Marui, 
the largest retailer of young people’s goods there. and we& 
opening a Viigin Megastore in the cent= of Tokyo this year. 
It would have cost us !%O million or f60 million in seed money 
just to have got in on our own, so we’re very pleased. We’ve 
also struck a partnership with Seibu Saison International. 
the Japanese hotels-and-leisure group, which has taken a 10 
percent stake in the airline. Our growth will come by finding 
people who are willing to take 10 or 20 percent stakes in new 
ventures we set up. If I’d known everything I know now. I’d 
have tried partners rather than going public. 
l Do people ask your advice now about going public? 
Yes, and some companies that are public and want to get out 
of it ask my advice. I was bending the ear of one chairman 
about why he should make’ his company private: it was 
grossly undervalued, and he didn’t own quite half, so it was in 
danger of being taken over. That’s another negative-below 
50 percent, you’re vulnerable and risk losing your company. 
If you own your company, you have to ask yourself if you want 
it to be the biggest in the world. If you are happy being not 
quite the biggest. “you don’t necessarily need that paper. 
a Does the City of London take too short-term a view? 
English stockbrokers do tend to behave a bit more like punt- 
ers than the Japanese or French. who seem to invest on a 
long-term basis; The City’s job is to make a living trading 
shares very quickly, and it isn’t really thinking about invest- 
ing in a company and sticking with it and seeing it grow in the 
next 10 years. The Japanese do that. and some of them even 
look at growing into the next generation. We’ve been dealing 
with French institutions lately, and they think more long 
term. So do the Germans. English banks are going to have to 
watch themselves-the Germans and French seem more 
aggressive in helping people do business. 
I How d& this difference show itself? 
Fomign banks take small stakes in companies. but the Eng- 
lish clearing banks don’t, so they have to be conservative in 
their lending. If you want to start a new companv and bor- 
row, say. f80.000, the English clearing banks woht take the 
risk because they can’t take a stake in the company-but the 
merchant banks will only talk to -you if you want to borrow 
E2 million or f3 million. 
m” ,-..y ,h-4;;:~ 
1 Are you much happier now that Virgin is a private com- 
pany again? 
It was the best thing that could have happened. I sometimes 
think. Christ. where would we be if the City had valued our 
company anywhere near what it was worth and we were still 
public? I think you’ve got to enjoy what you clo in life. If the 
people who run the company feel bee, they can make the rest 
of the people who work for the company enjoy it. and you can 
have a happy company. If the people at the top feel that their 
hands are tied and that they can’t make the kinds of decisions 
they feel are right for the company-and not just right for 
the shareholders and the City-then the company starts 
stiHing. So. s it turns out. we were very fortunate. 
cc I f anything goes wrong in a 
public company, it goes wrong 
very publiiy and happens very 
quickly-and emybody panics 
and pulls the rug out? 
a Were you very badly misunderstood by the financial 
community? 
We’ve got artists like Phil Collins. Peter Gabriel, Genesis, 
Mike Oldfield, and so on-artists who sell millions of al- 
bums year al?er year. And I’d go into meetings with ana- 
lysts, and they’d say, “Artists have short lives” . . . which 
is not the case. Virgin signs artists like Simple Minds and 
UB40, who’ll still be selling a lot of records 20 years on. In 
our presentations we explained that them is no one artist 
who ever sells mole than 6 percent of the record companys 
turnover and that 33 percent of its revenue comes tbrn 
back-catalogue sales, which increase every year that we 
carry on. Around ‘75 percent of the record companys earn- 
ings come hnrn overseas. Our German record company last 
year made f6 million or E7 million, our French company 
made f7 million or E8 million. and so on. Even when CS&ure 
Club took off. it didn’t account for more than 10 percent of 
our total earnings. 
Anyway, we tried to educate the City, and in a sense we 
failed-well. we did fail-and now I can play tennis with my 
neighbour and look him straight in the eye. 
U Were you too unconventional in the way you ran the 
company? You don’t like to wear a suit, and I’ve heard 
descriptions of conferences in which the advisers and the 
accountants were all wearing suits--and the chap in slacks 
and sweater was from Virgin. 
I am sure there was an element of that. But anything I do in 
life I like to do well. so I wasn’t going to go public and not play 
the game fully. We made a real effort to do most things by the 
book. There were certain things I did, like the Atlantic 
crossing in a powerboat. that did not affect the company and 
that I wasn’t going to stop. You shouldn’t live your life com- 
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pletelv because ofthe perception the City holds ofthe bottom 
line. You should lead your own life to an extent you feel is cor- 
rect. and I didn’t compromise. By English standards, Virgin 
is a fairly unconventional company. superficially. We do 
dress as we feel comfortable. We do work in quite pleasant 
environments. This house is, in effect. the head office and 
until six months ago my houseboat was virtually that . . . I 
like to work around my kids. The staff come first in our 
companv. which is perhaps a slightlyJapanese way of think- 
ing. I think it should be every company’s way of thinking. 
a Did you concentrate more on formal management when 
Virgin went public? 
One useful thing about going public ti that you do make sure 
your systems are absolutely watertight--so that. for exam- 
ple. you know week by week what each of your record stores 
is making. It has been very useful. ti a private company, to 
have got all those systems on board. 
I One of the useful things about going public, you said. was 
being able to use your paper for acquisitions. Are you glad 
now that you can’t do that? You’ve chosen not to buy other 
companies. 
Yes, I am very glad. During the Eighties, the City’s mistake 
was glamorising takeovers. They am very attractive to the 
City-it makes a lot of money out of them-but takeovers are 
not necessarily of great benefit to the employees. They deH- 
nitely come last in many of them. A lot of companies just got 
bigger and bigger and very, very impersonal. and I can’t see 
how many employees can enjoy working for them. If a com- 
pany needs cleaning out, it’s much better if that company 
sells off little bits of itself in management buy-outs. say, and 
gets smaller rather than being taken over. 
1 Virgin is a big company now and is going to become even 
bigger- How will you cope with that? 
I think that people want to keep testing themselves. They 
want to keep pnwing they can do a little bit mole than they 
are doing, that’s human nature. So even if1 were to say I feel 
that we shouldn’t get any bigger, that in itself would start 
demoralising people. All the people that work on the airline 
are longing to fly to Singapore and Australia: it’s a tmmen- 
dous challenge for everybody to break into new markets. 
But I think that we now have the kind of set-up at Virgin 
where there is no real difference between running 150 little 
companies or running 12 little companies. It’s obviously dif- 
ferent hrn running one company, but the moment you’ve got 
five or 10 little companies, then it doesn’t matter-almost- 
whether you’ve got 150 or 300 or 500. What these companies 
consist of are individuals There’s a group umbxella above 
them, but below it there are these very capable people run- 
ning the companies, and I think the more Ii-eedom you give 
them, the more they will blossom. 
I Have these managers shared in the rewards? 
Yes. We gave the two people running our American opera- 
tion 10 percent each three years ago, and their shares are now 
worth about $30 million. But they are the best people in the 
industry, and they have made the company worth a couple of 
hundred million dollars more. They am unpoachable because 
r nobody could pay them what they can earn by having shares 
s in Virgin. And you know, okay, we have given away a lot- 
, but what we have given away didn’t exist before. They have 
t created that wealth. 
m Should other public companies follow your example and 
go private? 
It was right for us not to be a public company, and I think it is 
most probably right for a lot of companies not to be public. 
Only about 5 percent of all the chairmen of public companies 
that I have talked to would not like to take their companies 
private ifthey were able to. I think that the City needs to r-e- 
evaiuace itself and see why people feel that way. We were ” . 
BEVERLY PLC 
TEACHING NOTES 
INTRODUCTION 
This is the actual story of an intrapreneur rolling out his vision into a fully fledged 
entrepreneurial success story. Dennis Brown goes the whole way, from a tiny office 
on the outskirts of Paris to a USM listing and a personal reward of over f500k 
(while still maintaining joint overall control). Only the name of the company and * 
leading 2 protagonists have been disguised. 
The story is noteworthy for a number of reasons not least of which is the fact that 
success has been achieved on the continent of Europe. The case is not meant to 
prescribe a course of action to achieve success in Europe. It does however make the 
point that there are opportunities for smaller companies and that 1992 is not the 
exclusive preserve of the major companies. 
There are some other common themes running through the case-study: 
1) Opportunism of the intra/entrepreneur 
2) The effective management team and willingness to delegate 
3) Rewarding effective performance throughout the company 
4) Using the resources of the bigger companies at the start 
The pedagogical objectives of the case, developed for use on owner-manager and 
MBA courses at Cranfield, are summarised in Exhibit 1. 
The case touches on a variety of topics but the focus is very much on marketing 
(particularly focusing on direct selling techniques, as an aid to low cost/high 
penetration of new markets) and human resource issues in the fast-growing 
company. (Finance did not present a major problem because of the company’s 
deposit taking, direct selling techniques.) Part 1 of the case starts with the period 
leading up to the management buyout in 1983; Part 2 takes the student through the 
growth phase 1983-1989 culminating in the listing on the USM. The concluding 
section 3 addresses some of the present concerns for the business. 
Students should prepare for class discussion by reading the case and industry notes * 
contained in Part 1, concentrating on the issues: 
(a) How many in the class would now offer to buy-out the company? Why? 
(Blackboard SWOT analysis attached - Exhibit 2); List the reasons for Solaglas 
wishing to d&invest (new owners, non-core activity, bad experience of direct selling, 
down-turn in orders) and determine reasons for M.B.O. (financial opportunity to 
roll out the company i.e. to expand in Europe by natural growth not acquisition). 
(b) How would you, as Dennis Brown, negotiate to buy-out the company? How 
would you value the company prior to negotiations, what tactics would you prepare 
for the negotiation discussions (starting position, fall back position etc.). 
Part 1 contains some “how-to” Exhibits (direct salesman’s contract) and examples of 
how to develop in Europe (sample market research, recruiting a team). 
Following this discussion, the shorter Part 2 can be issued to the class, allowing 5 
minutes for preparation. Class discussion should focus upon: 
(a) What new directions for growth should Beverly consider (more geographical 
expansion, new products); 
(b) How should the company organise for future growth (e.g. adopt more 
conventional selling approaches e.g. salaried salesmen instead of commission only, 
bearing in mind earlier Coldshield U.K. disaster); 
(c) How can the entrepreneurial owners harvest their efforts? (Their own 
objectives, pros and cons of alternative exit routes, e.g. trade sale vs going public.) + 
For the final discussion, Part 3 can be issued, and after 5 minutes preparation, final 
discussion should follow the above issues, endeavouring to get the class to: 
(1) Decide a mission statement/set of objectives for the company that will focus 
further growth; 
(2) recommend a further growth strategy for the company (which business, what 
investment strategy); 
(3) recommendations for role of founding entrepreneurs. In particular, focusing 
on whether more professional management could be introduced and how? Can 
professional managers work comfortably alongside intra/entrepreneurs? 
As a USM publicly quoted company these are some of the genuine issues currently 
facing Beverly PLC, and doubtless many others, as the entrepreneurial 1980’s 
companies in the U.K. face the more difficult trading conditions of the early 1990’s. 
How does Beverly, an English owned and quoted USM company, but with no 
operations in England, all in Europe, stand to benefit from post 1992 Europe? 
PEDAGOGICAL OB.JECTJVJQ$ 
To provide an “expansion in Europe” case for Cranfield Small Business 
Growth Programme (owners off lm - 5m turnover S.B.‘s) 
n start-up 
n roll out 
w To emphasize S.B. practical “how to expand” ideas, e.g. 
n market research 
n direct selling 
n control of key success factors 
s To provide a focus for strategy discussion 
m management buy outs/disinvestments 
n secondary market flotations 
n future growth options and objectives 
w To contrast entrepreneurs and professional managers 
n golf equipment vs core business 
n evolution and crisis! 
Exhibit 2 
PART ONE: A CONTINENTAL ADVENTURE 
INDUSTRY 
OPPORTUNITY/ 
THREATS 
MARKET 
How Big is 
French Market? 
- Assume likely to be 
f5m market like U.K. 
- M.Research (advert- 
isement) shows strong 
demand in Paris area. 
- Low cost of entry to 
build market share. 
. . Strength of Comnetrtron ? 
- No major competitors. 
- French builders appear 
to have forgotten low- 
technology solutions to 
lisingdamp. 
What are 
Beverly; 
ai&&& 
fo 
- Former employees likely 
to start as competitors 
(e.g. Dema). 
- Easy entry will 
encourage competitors as 
ill U.K.. & price wars. 
Possible Blackboard Plan 
Would vou offer to buv Beverly? 
COMPANY 
STRENGTHS/ 
WEAKNESES 
TFAM 
How Stronn is 
m? 
- experienced U.K. 
entrepreneur able 
to build Anglo/French 
team on back of 
Doulton. 
-II difllculties 
- Motivated sales 
force. 
How Imwrtant is 
-Name:! 
- Royal Doulton a 
powerful brand name, 
will be lost. 
MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY 
STRATEGY 
Does Beverlv have a 
WiMil’lQ fOrlllUh tQ 
role out? 
1. Product 
_ Chemical treatment is an 
AgrCment Certificate 
approved product 
nlzxi!x 
- Good margin, without 
excessive U.K. pressure 
to previous increase. 
3. Promotiog 
- Advertising strategy 
works, producing satis- 
factory low cost leads. 
4. &g$ 
- 2 good N. France depots. 
5. Peoolp 
- Direct selling methods 
introduced and successful. 
Good installation teams/ 
manager. 
COMPANY/ 
VALUATION 
Asset. P.E. value? 
- Company has 
survived start up 
costs and is 
operating 
profitably. 
- Good time to 
make an offer when 
little track 
record available. 
- Net assets are f4Ok 
P.E. 10 x PAT f3Ok 
(5 x PBT) 
Negotiation Strategy 
- Offer to buy 
company for f 170k 
- Threaten walk-out 
by management team 
to open in competit- 
ion instead. 
Good small business 
opportunity to get 
in and out? 
PART TWO: DEVELOPING A NETWORK OF EUROPEAN DEPOTS 
1) Rolling out a company from its original base. One particular method is suggested 
in this case, describing how the “ripple-effect” was put to good use throughout 
France and then into the Benelux countries. Company grew very much as had 
previously been the case in U.K., which is obvious lesson for those who think only 
way to expand in Europe is by acquisition. 
2) Developing management teams to deal with growth in different geographical 
locations. Consciously trying to avoid mistakes of earlier.U.K. growth i.e. no major 
price increases, conservative financial practice (provision for poor work), careful * 
control especially of key measures like advertising cost per lead, lead conversion 
rate. 
3) Having successfully built a company in Europe, as profitable as earlier in 
England, question now is should the’ entrepreneurial team “get in or get out”; 
continue to grow, possibly going public, or anticipating similar difficulties as earlier 
in England, get out (e.g. via trade sale, M.B.O. to French employees) before market 
matured or competition grew. . 
Issue here is very much decided by objectives of owner. Both Dennis and Mark, 
having previously been employees of a public group, had strong desire to be 
Directors of a public company, as well as personally rich. 
PART THREE: GOING PUBLIC AND WHERE TO NOW 
1) Having gone public, for largely personal reasons, the majority owners now face 
the little thought about role of new shareholder’s expectations! Discussion should 
focus on other options the entrepreneurs could have utilised (as per Richard 
Branson, Virgin article). 
2) After the gloss of the placing, how to live up to expectations and plan a public 
growth strategy is difficult for former entrepreneurs. Witness as Mark’s increasing 
interest in his hobby - sports equipment! All the “In Search of Excellence Books” 
suggest: 
- stick to your knitting! 
This would entail backward integration (buy Chemical supplier), especially perhaps 
a U.K. base for an English owned, but entirely European (non U.K!) operation. Or 
rleated diversification (e.g. like Rentokill, into other household treatment methods). 
All of this might be good textbook sense, but would it keep the two controlling 
entrepreneurs motivated? Could they, in turn, recruit professional management and 
work happily alongside them (or gradually withdraw). All real, live issues to 
explore! 
Teachers might at this stage make reference to the Greiner Curve (HBR July- 
August 1972); try and place Beverly on the growth curve and suggest how the 
company might best progress with mission statements and specific growth strategies. 
Equally the three boxes of ‘Growth Phases in a New Business’ (Exhibit 4) might be 
used to summarise the questions that arise in the beginning, middle and end of most 
entremeneurial activities. 
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